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Abstract

In the current fiscally constrained environment, the Air Force must allocate
resources where they are most needed and will be most effectively used. For aircraft, this
means spending money on weapon systems in a manner that optimizes aircraft
availability rates, thereby maximizing the warfighting capability of the Air Force. With
that in mind, this thesis endeavors to improve the analytical capability of the Air Force by
demonstrating a definitive link between operations and maintenance (O&M) spending
and aircraft availability rates. In order to do that, explanatory regression models are
developed that show the relationship between O&M spending and AA rates, while
controlling for as many other significant variables as the data allow. Ultimately, this
research was unable to show that aircraft availability rates are significantly influenced by
changes in O&M spending; however, suggestions for future research and potential policy
implications are discussed.
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OPTIMIZING AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY: WHERE TO SPEND YOUR NEXT
O&M DOLLAR

I: Introduction

Background
In his leadership message, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Financial
Management and Comptroller, Dr. Jamie M. Morin stated,
in this time of scarce resources … every dollar wasted or inefficiently expended is
an additional debt passed on to our children. … we are all charged with
balancing the imperative of effectively using resources to accomplish vital
national goals with the need to continuously … provide the capabilities needed in
the wars we are fighting today, and prepare for the uncertain conflicts of the
future (2009).
Regardless of the dollar value of the bottom line Air Force budget, Air Force decision
makers should expend resources in the most effective manner possible. That is, use
resources where they will have the most positive effect on the mission.
The mission of the United States Air Force is to “fly fight and win … in air, space
and cyberspace” (Donley and Schwartz, 2009:3). While the Air Force employs many
assets to achieve this mission, the most obvious and direct tools used are aircraft.
Whether the mission is close air support, airlift, aerial refueling, or reconnaissance, the
availability of necessary aircraft to perform the mission is a vital concern. Accordingly,
the Air Force spends a significant portion of its budget each year to sustain its aircraft. In
fiscal year (FY) 2009, the Air Force spent $42.1 billion on operations and maintenance
(O&M) to support its people and equipment. Of those O&M expenditures, the money
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spent directly on flying operations totaled $14.7 billion, which amounts to 12.9% of the
baseline budget (SAF/FMB, 2009).
Although the Air Force allocates a nontrivial portion of its budget to support its
aircraft, aircraft availability (AA) rates rise and fall with regularity. Figure 1 shows the
availability rates of aircraft by mission type from FY1999 to FY2009. As we can plainly
see, AA rates fluctuate drastically for each of the weapon system types shown from year
to year. Although it would be helpful to compare the historical AA rates to the goals set
for each weapon system over the same period, the Air Force did not begin establishing
AA standards until 2008. Prior to that, the Air Force focused most of its attention on
mission capable (MC) rates and the major commands (MAJCOMs) were primarily
responsible for setting their own goals (Tyler, 2009).

Figure 1: Aircraft Availability Rates, FY99 - FY09 (Tirpak, 2009)

With that said, Air Force leaders should have a better understanding of the factors
that influence AA rates so that they are able to affect positive change. Without an
adequate number or the right combination of available aircraft, the Air Force may not be
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able to accomplish its mission. In our study, we build on previous research to gain a
better understanding of the factors that affect AA rates. Specifically, we show the affect
that O&M costs have on AA rates, which will allow Air Force leaders to use O&M
resources as a means to control the AA rates of the Air Force fleet.

Purpose of This Study
In this study, we seek to determine which factors significantly affect aircraft
availability rates; O&M costs will be our primary independent variable of interest. In
order to do that, we develop explanatory multiple regression models that show
relationships between O&M costs and AA rates, while controlling for as many other
significant variables as our data allow. We use these findings to improve the analytical
capability of the Air Force when trying to determine how to allocate resources so that
O&M funding may be used as a tool to optimize aircraft availability.

Research Objective
The objective of this research is to develop explanatory models that demonstrate a
definitive link between O&M costs and aircraft availability.
Research Questions.
1. What variables are significant predictors of aircraft availability rates?
2. Are aircraft availability rates influenced by changes in O&M spending?
3. Do the aircraft availability rates of some weapon systems respond to changes
in O&M costs more than others?
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4. Can a single model be developed to represent multiple Mission Design Series
(MDS)?
5. Can the models produced by this research be used as an effective decision tool
for the Centralized Asset Management (CAM) office?

Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we described the current fiscal environment in which the Air
Force must operate. We outlined the need for a robust analytical process or tool that can
guide resource allocation decisions in an attempt to optimize aircraft availability. Finally,
we outlined the purpose of this study and listed our research questions.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Chapter II provides background
relating to aircraft availability, a summary of previous research, and a review of the
resource allocation process. In Chapter III, we describe our dataset and outline the
methods that will be used to analyze our data. Next, we present the results and analysis
in Chapter IV. Finally, we summarize the results and provide policy implications based
on our findings in Chapter V.
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II: Literature Review

Given our research questions and overall objective, we seek to expand our
knowledge concerning aircraft availability and the variables that may affect AA rates.
We begin this chapter by discussing the importance of maintaining an adequate quantity
of mission capable aircraft and provide an overview of the metrics used by the Air Force
to assess the health of its fleet. Next, we summarize the findings of previous research
concerning the factors that may affect aircraft availability. Then, we review several
models that have been developed and used by the Air Force to forecast aircraft
availability. Finally, we provide the reader with an understanding of both the old
resource allocation process and the new process developed through ongoing Air Force
initiatives.

Mission Impact of Low Aircraft Availability Rates
As we stated earlier, the mission of the U.S. Air Force is “to fly, fight and win …
in air, space and cyberspace.” To achieve that mission, the Air Force relies on its six
“distinctive capabilities” which include the following (DAF, 2003):
1. Air and Space Superiority
2. Global Attack
3. Rapid Global Mobility
4. Precision Engagement
5. Information Superiority
6. Agile Combat Support

5

Not surprisingly, each of these capabilities depends entirely or in part on the
availability of the right mix of Air Force aircraft. Simply put, without a sufficient
number of mission capable aircraft ready to fly at any given time, the Air Force cannot
perform its stated mission.
The importance of AA extends to the unit-level as well. Perhaps the most direct
costs associated with inadequate AA are lost training opportunities. Pilots and their
associated aircrew members require a certain number of sorties and flying hours per
month depending on the aircraft they fly and the missions they are training to support.
AFI 11-(MDS specific volume) specifies exactly what is required for each weapon
system aircrew to maintain combat mission ready (CMR) status (Lipina, 2009). AFI 112F-16 Volume 1 defines CMR as “the minimum training required for pilots to be
qualified and proficient in all of the primary missions tasked to their assigned unit and
weapon system” (DAF, 2007:8). In the case of F-16 aircrew, pilots are required to fly
nine or ten sorties per month depending on whether they are experienced or
inexperienced. If this training requirement cannot be met because not enough aircraft are
available, aircrew members may be placed on probation or non-CMR status at the
discretion of the squadron commander. If aircrew members who are on probation fail to
meet the minimum CMR requirements the following month, they will be demoted to nonCMR status (Lipina, 2009). This scenario would result in degraded readiness of an entire
unit and decreased operational flexibility.
Maintainers experience lost training opportunities as well. When AA rates are
low, maintainers feel pressure to fix aircraft quickly using whatever resources are
available. Often this means cannibalizing parts from one aircraft to support another
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aircraft. Cannibalizing parts requires a maintainer to spend time removing a part from
one aircraft and then installing the part on another aircraft. The extra time involved may
result in lost training opportunities for themselves or a lost opportunity to train others
(Oliver, 2001).
Many of the other costs associated with low AA rates are so intertwined with AA
rates themselves that it is hard to decouple the cause and the effect. For example, low
AA rates decrease morale and increase the workload and stress for maintainers, which
may negatively affect retention rates. When second term and career airmen decide to
separate, the workload increases for the remaining airmen, especially the 5- and 7-level
maintainers. Not only do these technicians have to perform more work on aircraft, but
also their supervisory and training responsibilities increase as the ratio of 3-level airmen
increases. This means that the need for supervision and on-the-job training increases at
the same time the workload increases because of the need to generate aircraft (Oliver,
2001). As we have shown here, the cost of low AA rates are extensive and may have
enduring negative consequences.

Fleet Management Metrics Overview
In Air Force maintenance organizations, metrics are used extensively to assess the
quality, quantity, and timeliness of the maintenance actions being performed as well as
the overall health of the fleet and even the readiness of the personnel. However, when it
comes to measuring the health of the fleet and the effectiveness of the maintenance
performed, the two metrics that dominate are the AA rate and the MC rate.
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According to Air Force Instruction 21-101 (AFI 21-101) Aircraft and Equipment
Maintenance Management, the MC rate is the percentage of unit-possessed hours that
aircraft are either fully mission capable (FMC) or partially mission capable (PMC) for a
specific period of measurement (e.g., weekly or monthly). FMC status simply means that
an aircraft can perform all of its assigned missions. PMC status means that an aircraft
can perform at least one, but not all of its assigned missions (DAF, 2006). MC rate is
calculated using equation 1.
(1)
AA, as defined by AFI 21-101, is the percentage of a fleet not in a depot status or
not mission capable (NMC) status. Alternatively, the AA rate is the percentage of a
fleet’s total active inventory (TAI) that is available (mission capable). NMC aircraft are
aircraft that are unable to perform any of their wartime missions (DAF, 2006). The AA
rate is calculated using equation 2.

(2)
Intuitively, the complement of availability is nonavailability, which consists of
five components: the unit possessed not reported (UPNR) rate, the depot rate, the not
mission capable maintenance (NMCM) rate, the not mission capable supply (NMCS)
rate, and the not mission capable both (NMCB) rate (AFLMA, 2009). Insight into why
AA rates are low may be garnered from investigating these five areas of nonavailability,
which we will briefly explain.
As the name states, the UPNR rate is the percentage of a fleet’s TAI that are unit
possessed, but not reported. When an aircraft suffers major damage or is in need of
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major maintenance, the owning unit may be required to wait for higher headquarters to
make a decision regarding how to proceed. During this time, the aircraft would be UPNR
because the unit is waiting to be told what to do next. Not surprisingly, the depot rate is
the percentage of a fleet’s TAI that are in depot status. Typically, these aircraft are either
awaiting or undergoing depot level maintenance (AFLMA, 2009). The NMCM rate is
the percentage of possessed aircraft that are unable to perform primary assigned missions
because the aircraft is in need of maintenance that will be carried out by the unit. The
NMCS rate is the percentage of possessed aircraft that are unable to execute primary
missions for supply reasons (e.g., lack of spare parts). Finally, the NMCB rate is the
percentage of possessed aircraft that are unable to perform primary assigned missions for
both maintenance and supply reasons (DAF, 2006).
As stated in the Air Force Logistics Management Agency’s handbook titled
Maintenance Metrics U.S. Air Force and consistent with the goals of Expeditionary
Logistics for the 21st Century (eLog21), the AA rate is the metric that will be used to
measure the health of the fleet (AFLMA, 2009). The primary reason that the AA rate is a
more useful metric than the MC rate is that it reflects a more complete picture of the fleet.
While the numerator is the same for both metrics, the denominator is different which
results in a gap between the two rates. The MC rate only considers aircraft that are
possessed by operational units and ignores aircraft that are in UPNR and depot status.
This means that the denominator is a fluid number and will always result in a rate that is
greater than the AA rate. The AA rate on the other hand reflects all aircraft in the fleet.
Simply put, the AA rate answers a question that is central to assessing combat capability:
How many jets are ready to fly?
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Previous Research Reveals Factors Affecting Aircraft Availability
In our review of literature from the 1990s to 2009, we found an abundance of
research completed by the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), the Naval
Postgraduate School (NPS), RAND, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and
the Air Force Logistics Management Agency (AFLMA). The majority of these studies
focused on identifying predictive factors to be used in forecasting MC rates. While these
studies have contributed a significant amount to the existing knowledge on AA, none of
the research has focused directly on O&M costs. Our investigation seeks to close this
gap in knowledge.
Although our research focuses on AA, the majority of prior research discusses
MC rates. The reason for this is that MC rates were the most commonly used metric to
assess fleet health until 2004 when Air Force decision makers introduced the AA metric
as a part of eLog21 to provide an enterprise view of the total fleet (Tyler, 2009). Since
that time, some research has focused on AA rates and the factors that go into it, but not
enough for the purposes of our literature review. Nevertheless, research regarding MC
rates will be sufficient since we know that total MC hours are the most significant factor
in determining AA rates.
A study published in Air Force Journal of Logistics in 2001 identified 53
variables that may affect MC rates (Table 1). Previous research and history have shown
that these factors may be grouped into six main categories: personnel, environment,
reliability and maintainability, funding, aircraft operations, and logistics operations.
While it is doubtful that an entirely complete list of factors could be created, this table
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serves as a very good starting point for our research. We will briefly discuss several of
the more prevalent factors below.
Table 1: Potential Factors Affecting MC Rates (Oliver, et al., 2001)

Personnel
In his 2001 AFIT thesis, Captain Steve Oliver used correlation and regression
analysis to identify factors associated with MC rates of F-16C/D aircraft. His results
showed that as the number of inexperienced personnel (measured by rank or skill level)
increased, MC rates decreased. Higher ratios of 3-levels to either 5- or 7-levels (or both)
were also negatively correlated to MC rates. Concerning reenlistment rates, Oliver
determined that first term and career airmen along with the overall reenlistment rate were
positively correlated with MC rates. Additionally, the reenlistment rate of eligible crew
chiefs showed a high degree of positive correlation. Finally, the ratio of maintainers per
aircraft, and total maintainers assigned demonstrated strong positive correlations (Oliver,
2001).
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In a 2003 report, the GAO determined that shortages of maintenance personnel as
well as a lack of experienced maintainers contributed to low MC rates (GAO, 2003).
Similarly, research completed in 2004 on C-17 MC rates showed that crew chief manning
levels have a significant positive relationship with MC rates (Huscroft, 2004). Finally, an
article published in the Air Force Journal of Logistics in 2007 examined F-16C/D MC
rates and found the percentage of 7- and 9-level maintainers to be significant in
explaining MC rates. Specifically, the authors developed a model using just these two
dependent variables to explain 82 percent of the variance observed in MC rates (Chimka
and Nachtmann, 2007).
Environment
Concerning the operational environment, Capt Billy Gilliland used regression to
test the relationship between 13 common measures of aircraft maintenance and several
dependent variables in his 1990 AFIT thesis. Among other findings, the analysis showed
a positive correlation between MC rates and the average number of possessed aircraft
(Gilliland, 1990).
Intuitively, aircraft age is a likely consideration when discussing availability. The
GAO confirmed this notion citing aircraft age as a factor that affects MC rates.
According to interviews with logistics officials from the services, aircraft failure rates
follow a curve that is similar to the “bathtub curve” depicted in Figure 2. While the Air
Force’s inventory continues to age, failures become more common as aircraft reach the
end of their useful life. Exacerbating this effect are increased deployments over recent
years, which has forced aircraft to operate at higher than normal rates and has accelerated
aging concerns (GAO, 2003).
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Figure 2: Bathtub Curve (Wilkins, 2002)

Prior to 2002, the Air Force structured its flying units under what was called an
“Objective Wing Structure.” Maintenance organizations reported to either the operations
group commander or the logistics group commander. In October of 2002, the Air Force
transitioned to the “Combat Wing Structure,” which aligned all maintenance units under
a maintenance group commander with the goals of “enhancing core competencies,
improving aircraft sortie production, and improving fleet health” (Barthol, 2005:3).
Research completed in 2005 concluded that this organizational change was effective in
meeting its stated goals (Barthol, 2005).
Reliability & Maintainability
Gilliland showed a negative correlation between MC rates and both the
cannibalization rate and awaiting maintenance discrepancies (Gilliland, 1990). Next,
Lieutenant Commander Patricia Moore showed that cannibalizations are negatively
correlated with FMC rates of deployed aircraft (Moore, 1998). Lastly, Oliver’s research
found a strong positive correlation linking 8-hour fix rates and MC rates (Oliver, 2001).
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Funding
According to a RAND study completed in 2009, aircraft maintained by contractor
logistics support (CLS) have a higher proportion of contractually fixed costs each year
than organically supported aircraft. RAND states that as a result “CLS programs have
been less affected by funding instability than have organically supported programs, which
must often reduce funding for spare parts when budgets are cut” (Boito, 2009:46). To
illustrate this point, RAND compared the total not mission capable supply (TNMCS)
achieved rates and standards between CLS and organically supported aircraft with the
same mission over a three-year period. Figure 3 illustrates a representative sample of
their findings (Boito, 2009).

Figure 3: Comparison of TNMCS Rates and Standards for CLS and Organically Supported Trainer Aircraft
(Boito, 2009)

While all aircraft exceeded their respective standard, CLS aircraft are held to a
much tougher standard than organic aircraft. RAND argues that CLS aircraft achieve
better (i.e., lower) TNMCS rates because they receive more funding than organic aircraft.
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RAND further concludes that high AA rates are “largely a function of the resources
devoted to maintain them” (Boito, 2009:46).
Additionally, the GAO reports that officials from all the services blame
underfunding spare parts inventories, maintenance depots, and other areas of maintenance
and supply as a reason for low MC rates (GAO, 2003).
Aircraft Operations
Moore’s analysis found that an increase in the number of sorties causes FMC
rates to increase; however, an increase in the number of sorties combined with an
increase in the number of cannibalizations causes FMC rates to significantly decrease
(Moore, 1998).
Logistics Operations
Pertaining to logistics, Gilliland determined that awaiting parts discrepancies are
negatively correlated with MC rates (Gilliland, 1990). Moore’s research found that FMC
rates increase as the percentage of requests for consumable or repairable items that are
filled in one to two days increases (Moore, 1998). Oliver’s research found that the most
significant correlations between logistics variables and MC rates appeared with a lag of
two quarters; however, the statistical significance was not strong enough to warrant
inclusion in his models (Oliver, 2001). Lastly, the GAO reports that shortages of spare
parts contribute to low MC rates. They say that this may be caused by underestimates of
demand, contracting issues, or other problems (GAO, 2003). We summarize the findings
of previous research in Table 2.
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Table 2: Variable Correlations with Aircraft Availability Rates

Category

Personnel

Environment

Variable
Ratio of 3-levels to 5-levels
Ratio of 3-levels to 7-levels
Total # of Inexperienced
Maintainers by Rank or Skill
Level
Maintainers Per Aircraft
Total # of Maintainers
Overall Reenlistment Rate
Reenlistment Rate of FirstTerm Airmen
Reenlistment Rate of Career
Airmen
Reenlistment Rate of Eligible
Crew Chiefs
Crew Chief Manning Levels
Percentage of 7-level
Maintainers
Percentage of 9-level
Maintainers
Average # of Possessed
Aircraft

Funding
Aircraft Operations
Logistics Operations

Author
Oliver, 2001
Oliver, 2001

Negative

Oliver, 2001

Positive
Positive
Positive

Oliver, 2001
Oliver, 2001
Oliver, 2001

Positive

Oliver, 2001

Positive

Oliver, 2001

Positive

Oliver, 2001

Positive

Huscroft, 2004
Chimka and
Nachtmann, 2007
Chimka and
Nachtmann, 2007

Positive
Positive
Positive

Gilliland, 1990

Aircraft Age

Mixed
(Bathtub
Curve)

GAO, 2003

Transition to Combat Wing
Structure in 2002

Positive

Barthol, 2005

Negative

Gilliland, 1990;
Moore, 1998;
Oliver, 2001

Negative

Gilliland, 1990

Positive
Positive

Oliver, 2001
RAND, 2009

Cannibalization Rate
Reliability &
Maintainability

Correlation
Negative
Negative

Awaiting Maintenance
Discrepancies
8-Hour Fix Rate
CLS supported
Sorties

Mixed

Moore, 1998;

Awaiting Parts Discrepancies
% of Requests for
Consumables Filled in 1-2
days

Negative

Gilliland, 1990

Positive

Moore, 1998
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Establishing Aircraft Availability Goals
According to AFI 21-103, Equipment Inventory, Status and Utilization Reporting,
“MAJCOMs establish capability goals in coordination with the Air Staff to include but
not limited to MC, total not mission capable maintenance (TNMCM), and TNMCS.
These goals enable HQ USAF to assess resource allocation funding on a quarterly basis”
(DAF, 2005:9). Although these lines are taken from the most current version of AFI 21103, the information is outdated. Since implementation of eLog21 (which we will
discuss in detail later in this chapter), the MAJCOMs no longer set their own capability
goals. Instead, the Air Force Directorate for Logistics, Installations & Mission Support
(AF/A4/7) sets common capability standards for each weapon system (i.e., MDS) across
active duty units and a complementary set of standards for guard and reserve units (Tyler,
2009).
In 2007, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force--Weapon System Review directed
emphasis on AA instead of MC rates when assessing fleet health (Tyler, 2009). Shortly
thereafter, AF/A4/7 developed a methodology for determining AA standards, given in
equation 3.
(3)
In this equation, primary aircraft inventory (PAI) is the number of aircraft
assigned to a unit for the performance of its operational mission. The MC standard is
based on the summation of MC hours required for all units to meet their operational,
training, and test requirements (HQ AFMC/A4, 2009).
Since this equation is tied directly to MC rate standards, the value-added from this
new metric is uncertain. Currently, AF/A4 is working on developing a new methodology
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with the goal of directly linking AA standards to readiness and decoupling AA from MC
standards (Tyler, 2009).

Aircraft Sustainability Models and Aircraft Availability Forecasting Models
Over the years, the Air Force has used many different models to forecast MC and
AA rates as well as the resources required to support its weapon systems. Although
many of the models have been proven to provide useful results, there is currently no
approved Air Force method to forecast MC or AA rates (OSD, 2009). We examine
several of the prevailing models in order to gain an understanding of the techniques and
variables that are used, as well as to see what role, if any, O&M costs have played.
Logistics Composite Model
Created in the late 1960s, the Logistics Composite Model (LCOM) is a
“stochastic, discrete-event simulation that relies on probabilities and random number
generators to model scenarios in a maintenance unit by manipulating certain variables”
(Cole et al., 2007:1). Although the LCOM can calculate the resources required to support
a weapon system at a given capability level (defined as sortie generation) considering a
variety of variables, it is most prominently used by the Air Force to determine manpower
levels in operational maintenance units. Specifically, the LCOM is used by the
MAJCOMs to establish 65-70% of their maintenance manpower requirements (Cole et
al., 2007). On the other hand, the LCOM does not directly consider the O&M funds
needed to support a weapon system.
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Aircraft Sustainability Model
The Aircraft Sustainability Model (ASM) is used to determine the number of
spare parts required at Air Force bases and depots during wartime operations, peacetime
operations, or combined operations. Given a desired level of aircraft availability or other
readiness measure, the ASM specifies the exact quantity and optimal mix of spare parts
in order to meet that goal. Logistics planners currently use the ASM for base-level
applications such as calculating the spare parts needed to sustain a squadron of F-15s
during a 60-day deployment in order to achieve an 80 percent AA rating at the end of day
60 (Blazer and Sloan, 2007). From our discussions with analysts currently working in the
Air Force Materiel Command Cost Analysis (AFMC/FMC) office and the CAM office,
we understand that this model does not inform enterprise level resource allocation
decisions.
Mobility Aircraft Availability Forecasting Simulation Model
Beginning in 2003 and continuing through at least 2005, contractors from
Northrop Grumman and Wright State University developed the Mobility Aircraft
Availability Forecasting Simulation Model (MAAF) in response to the Air Mobility
Command (AMC) Directorate of Logistics’ request for a better forecasting tool. MAAF
is an object-oriented modeling and simulation tool that is purportedly capable of
predicting AA rates, providing “what if” analysis, and offering insight into problems that
may affect AA (Wall, 2004; Ciarallo et al., 2005). Although the model proved to be a
useful prototype in laboratory conditions, AMC determined the model was not ready for
implementation in real-world operations.
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Funding/Availability Multimethod Allocator for Spares
As recently as 2001, the Air Forced utilized the Funding/Availability
Multimethod Allocator for Spares (FAMMAS) model to forecast MC rates for each
mission design series (MDS) in its inventory. Employing time-series forecasting
methods, FAMMAS uses the last three years of historical TNMCS and TNMCM data
combined with past, present, and future spares funding to forecast MC rates. While it
produces useful results, time-series models like FAMMAS do not provide insight into
potential cause-and-effect relationships that may be exploited to affect MC rates.
FAMMAS produces its forecasts by simply projecting data trends, not by using
explanatory models. Furthermore, FAMMAS does not incorporate any operations,
personnel, or environment-related variables in the model; it uses only TNMCS and
TNMCM data that act as adjustment factors. Consequently, FAMMAS is not an
effective tool to use for policy or resource decisions because of the limited scope of
variables used in the model and because the relationships between the variables are
largely unknown (Oliver, et al., 2001).
Aircraft Availability Model
Introduced as part of the Secondary Item Requirements System (D041 then, now
D200A) in the late 1980s, the Aircraft Availability Model (AAM) is a tool that
maximizes aircraft availability given some level of funding. Using marginal analysis, the
AAM is able to build AA curves (see Figure 4) which can be used to prioritize funding
for a given set of weapon systems (Blazer and Sloan, 2007). However, the AAM
considers an aircraft available if it is not awaiting resupply of a spare part. This means
that the model is only concerned with minimizing the TNMCS rate given some level of

20

funding; it does not account for the other aspect of non-availability such as the NMCM,
depot, or UPNR rates. The Air Force logistics community uses the model to compute the
quantities needed for safety levels of the spare parts that it manages. The resulting safety
levels become part of the overall requirement that drives budget requests, repair planning,
and spare parts purchases (Hill, 2007).

Figure 4: Aircraft Availability Curve (Blazer and Sloan, 2007)

Weapon System Sustainment Resource Allocation Process Prior to Centralized
Asset Management
Prior to FY2008, the Air Force replicated the process to determine weapon system
sustainment requirements, allocate resources, and execute funds across each of the ten
MAJCOMS (including the Guard and Reserves) through stove-piped business areas.
Figure 5 approximately represents this process. Requirements determination began with
the MAJCOMS developing their individual requirements with input from AFMC product
and logistics centers. Then, each MAJCOM created their budget and program objective
memorandum (POM) inputs based on those requirements and submitted them to Air Staff
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(Naguy and Keck, 2007). At this stage, requirements usually exceeded the resources
available so resources were allocated on a “percent funded” basis (McKown, 2009).
After enactment of funds, Air Staff sent funds to the MAJCOMS for execution. Finally,
the MAJCOMS provided funds to the appropriate AFMC product and logistics centers
for every program they operated on an expense-by-expense basis for execution.
Additionally, product and logistics centers, depots, and supply operations exchanged
funds within AFMC. As a result, over two million transactions occurred every year
between AFMC’s supply and maintenance activities alone (Naguy and Keck, 2007).
Requirements

Programming / Budget

Execution
Product Ctr

AFMC
Prod/Log Ctrs
MAJCOM

MAJCOM
ALC

Depot
WCF

MAJCOM

MAJCOM

AF POM
& Budget

ALC
MAJCOM

MAJCOM

Supply
WCF
MAJCOM

MAJCOM

ALC

Product Ctr
Resources

Requirements

Checkbooks

Figure 5: Pre-FY2008 Requirements Determination, Resource Allocation, & Execution Process
(Naguy and Keck, 2007)

This process resulted in numerous inefficiencies, shortcomings, and unfavorable
outcomes. Every command devoted significant time, money, and manpower into parallel
activities. Since the process started at low organizational levels, the lead-time for
formulating requirements was pushed well ahead of the execution of funds, which limited
the flexibility of the entire process to respond to changing conditions. Next, because each
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of the commands was concerned with getting their fair share of the available sustainment
funds, the process encouraged an adversarial relationship between the operating
MAJCOMS, Air Staff and AFMC. Furthermore, since resources were traditionally
allocated on a “percent funded” basis, MAJCOMs had an incentive to artificially inflate
their actual requirements so that they might avoid receiving only a percentage of what
they had requested (Naguy and Keck, 2007). Additionally, this practice of unconstrained
requirements determination was left virtually unchecked because resource allocation was
not based on performance (McKown, 2009).
Fleet management was possibly the biggest shortcoming of the old resource
allocation process. In many cases, more than one MAJCOM operates a particular
weapon system. As an example, six MAJCOMs currently fly the F-15. Under the old
process, six operating MAJCOMs determined their requirements for their share of the F15 fleet, but no single organization or individual was responsible for the resources
necessary to support the fleet as a whole. As a result, one weapon system was “owned”
by six separate entities, but no single entity had the scope or authority necessary to
manage the entire fleet from a holistic perspective (Naguy and Keck, 2007).
Finally, due to the different procedures used and subsequent inconsistencies
inherent in the requirements determination and resource allocation process, there was not
a feasible way to determine the impact of funding reductions on aircraft availability. This
shortcoming meant that Air Force leaders were unable to know if the needs of the
warfighter were going to be met in an environment of constrained resources (McKown,
2009).

23

Expeditionary Logistics for the 21st Century and Centralized Asset Management
Given the myriad shortcomings of the status quo, the Air Force needed to find a
better way of doing business. As a result of direction from Air Force leaders and
consistent with the ubiquitous and overarching Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st
Century (AFSO21) effort, the Air Force Logistics community developed eLog21 as a
strategic action plan that seeks to “fundamentally change the way logistics is
accomplished Air Force wide” (eLog21 Fact Sheet, 2009). According to the eLog21 fact
sheet, the campaign is composed of a number of initiatives and ultimately strives to reach
two goals: increase equipment availability to match aircraft availability (AA) targets, and
reduce operations and support (O&S) costs by 10% (eLog21 Fact Sheet, 2009).
CAM is a specific eLog21 initiative undertaken jointly by AF/A4P, SAF/FMB
and AFMC whose mission is to “centralize and integrate management of Air Force
sustainment to optimize warfighting capability through effective and efficient allocation
of resources across the enterprise” (Naguy and Keck, 2007:5). To achieve this mission,
CAM centralizes programming, budgeting, and execution of weapon system resources
within AFMC while standardizing and streamlining requirements determination for the
Active Duty Air Force; currently, CAM does not manage weapon systems operating in
Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) or the Air National Guard (ANG). As a result,
CAM provides the Air Force with an enterprise level view of its fleet, which makes it
possible to maximize warfigthing capability through the optimization of aircraft
availability (Naguy and Keck, 2007). In a nutshell, CAM was created to fix the
burdensome requirements determination, resource allocation and execution process
described in the previous section.
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Beginning in fiscal year 2008, CAM implemented the new process depicted in
Figure 6. Requirements determination begins with the lead MAJCOMs for each
particular weapon system working with the additional user MAJCOMs to formulate total
system requirements. Then, the lead MAJCOMs collaborate with AFMC product and
logistics centers to finish developing and prioritizing requirements from an Air Force
enterprise perspective. Once completed, AFMC submits a consolidated POM and budget
request to Air Staff. Following enactment of funds, AFMC provides money directly to
the appropriate product centers and logistics centers for execution. Finally, CAM has the
ability to manage sustainment resource trade space throughout the year of execution
because there are no longer multiple “owners” and multiple “checkbooks” being
maintained by the MAJCOMs; resources are now holistically managed by the CAM
office (Naguy and Keck, 2007).

Figure 6: New Centralized Asset Management Process (Naguy and Keck, 2007)
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We are interested in the new CAM process because it lays the foundation to
provide the Air Force with the organizational structure necessary to holistically manage
weapon systems. In other words, given this new process, the Air Force will be able to
use O&M funding as a tool to optimize aircraft availability. However, the Air Force
must use the correct metrics to measure weapon system availability and it must employ
robust analytical tools to guide resource allocation decisions. We argue that the Air
Force is using the correct metrics to measure weapon system availability; however, it
does not currently have robust analytical tools or processes in place to guide its resource
allocation decisions. Our research seeks to establish a definitive link between O&M
costs and AA so that decision makers will have the information they need to optimize
AA.

Chapter Summary
In previous sections, we discussed the importance of maintaining an adequate
quantity of mission capable aircraft and provided an overview of the metrics used by the
Air Force to assess the health of its fleet. We summarized the findings of previous
research concerning that factors that may affect aircraft availability. Then, we provided
an explanation of how the Air Force establishes AA rate standards. Next, we reviewed
several models that have been developed and used by the Air Force to forecast AA rates.
Finally, we detailed how the Air Force previously determined weapon system
sustainment requirements, allocated resources, and executed funds. We explained how
eLog21 and its subsequent initiative Centralized Asset Management have provided the
organizational change necessary to allow the Air Force to manage its sustainment
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resources holistically. Despite the significant amount of research already accomplished,
we find a significant gap concerning the relationship between O&M costs and AA, and
thus see the need for further analysis.
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III: Data Collection and Methodology

As we have shown in the literature review, a multitude of factors influence AA
rates. Due to the complexity and numerous relationships that are possible among the
factors, we collected data for an assortment of variables in order to build a dataset
sufficient for constructing explanatory models. First, we explain the scope of our data
collection and research. Second, we acknowledge the sources that we used to obtain the
data. Third, we describe each of the variables while discussing the limitations within the
dataset. Next, we describe how we analyze the variables in order to gain a better
understanding of their characteristics and predictive ability. Finally, we discuss the
methods that we use to build our explanatory models and generate results.

Scope of Data Collection and Research
The availability and reliability of data, specifically the data needed to capture
O&M costs, determines the scope of our research. Much of the knowledge we rely on to
make decisions regarding our cost data come from interviews with contractors who
maintain the Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) database and an AFTOC users’
training workshop.
As we discussed in Chapter II, the scope of CAM’s mission extends only to the
Active Duty Air Force; it does not manage the O&M funds for weapon systems that
operate in AFRC or ANG. For this reason, we only analyze Active Duty aircraft in our
study because our ultimate goal is to advance the analytical capability of CAM by
demonstrating a definitive link between O&M spending and AA. Additionally, research
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and development appropriations fund the majority of weapon systems operated by Air
Force Materiel Command (AFMC), not O&M appropriations. Thus, we will not include
any data attributable to aircraft assigned within AFMC.
At the beginning of FY1998, the Air Force made significant changes to
accounting classifications, particularly those codes that capture costs related to flying
operations. Therefore, our data collection begins with FY1998. The data maintained in
AFTOC are subject to updates on a recurring basis as new information becomes available
and corrections are made. Because of this, our last period of data is for the fourth quarter
of FY08. We reason that data from this period should be static and no longer subject to
significant updates or corrections. Finally, in an attempt to keep our definition of O&M
costs standard across all MDS, we only evaluate organically maintained aircraft in our
study. CLS maintained aircraft report their costs to different accounting classifications
than organically maintained aircraft so the costs are not directly comparable.
Since we will analyze only Active Duty (excluding AFMC), organically
maintained aircraft with data from 1998 – 2008, we can further narrow the scope of our
research to MDS that fit this criteria. Specifically, we choose to analyze aircraft that
have data available from 1998 – 2008, that are still in the active Air Force inventory, and
that have a TAI of at least 19. Table 3 lists the MDS that we analyze in this study.
Table 3: List of MDS Chosen for Study

MDS
A-10A
OA-10A
B-1B
B-2A
B-52H
F-15C
F-15D

F-15E
F-16C
F-16D
KC-135R
KC-135T
T-38A
T-38C
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Data Sources and Variables
Data Sources
We obtained data for this study using three databases: the Logistics Installations
and Mission Support – Enterprise View (LIMS-EV) database, the AFTOC management
information system, and the Reliability and Maintainability Information System
(REMIS). Created as an eLog21 initiative, LIMS-EV provides a single point of entry to a
variety of legacy data systems such as REMIS and the Multi-echelon Resources and
Logistics Network (MERLIN). LIMS-EV allows users to acquire standardized data and

tracks metrics, trends, and results (LIMS-EV Fact Sheet, 2010). We found the AA,
aircraft age, TAI, and cannibalization data using LIMS-EV. AFTOC is a tool that
integrates cost, logistic, and personnel data from more than a dozen legacy systems into a
single format. In order to present useful, coherent data, AFTOC assigns (or allocates
when required) the data to weapon systems, bases, and MAJCOMs according to standard
business rules (AFTOC, 2009). Our O&M cost and personnel data came from the
AFTOC database. REMIS is the Air Force’s primary database for aircraft usage data.
Similar to LIMS-EV and AFTOC, REMIS interfaces with a variety of other systems to
provide consolidated data (Oliver, 2001). We used REMIS to retrieve our data for flying
hours, sorties, and landings.
Dependent Variable: Aircraft Availability
Our goal in this study is to develop explanatory models that will demonstrate a
definitive link between O&M costs and AA. Thus, AA will serve as our dependent
variable. We retrieved our data from LIMS-EV at the MDS level, by MAJCOM, by
fiscal year quarter. AA is most commonly expressed as a rate; however, we also obtained
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AA data in the form of the average number of available aircraft and the total number of
available hours. Table 4 shows an example of this data.
Table 4: Subset of Normalized Aircraft Availability Data from LIMS-EV

Independent Variable: O&M Costs
Our primary independent variable of interest in this study is O&M costs.
Specifically, we are interested in those costs that can be directly attributed to supporting
the flying operations of a given MD or MDS. For this reason, the availability and
reliability of data for this variable determine the scope of our research.
Element of Expense/Investment Code (EEIC) 644, also known as Material
Support Division (MSD), contain costs directly associated with the flying hour program.
Costs for EEIC 644 can be further disaggregated by transaction type. Fly-depot level
repairables (DLRs) are recorded as transaction type XD2, consumable items are coded
XB3, and base level repairable items are labeled XF3. Transactions may occur as
charges or credits; however, our data only consider the resulting net costs. Additional
consumable costs are found in EEIC 609 (General Supply Division), but these costs are
not considered because their range extends far beyond flying operations. Furthermore,
EEIC 645 contains other DLR costs, but we exclude these costs from our study as well
because they are not “fly-DLRs.” It is also worth noting that CLS costs are accounted for
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in EEIC 578, but as we mentioned previously, CLS aircraft will not be included in our
research. Our study only considers those costs contained in EEIC 644 because it
represents the segment of O&M costs that are directly attributable to flying operations.
EEIC 644 costs in AFTOC are simultaneously allocated to the MDS they were
used to support, indicated by the “Mission Design Series—Standard Reporting
Designator (MDS SRD)” column heading, in addition to the weapon system whose
program element code (PEC) was used to pay the bill, reflected by the “Mission
Design—Cost Analysis Improvement Group (MD CAIG)” column heading. In the
majority of circumstances these two fields match, in which case there is no problem.
When the MDS SRD field does not match the MD CAIG field, we simply allocate the
dollars to the weapon system identified in the MDS SRD field because that is the system
supported by the expenditure. However, two cases arise that force us to make some
judgmental allocations based on the information available. When the MDS SRD field
contains “null” (no data entered), we look to the MD CAIG field for information. If there
is a weapon system identified in the MD CAIG field, we allocate the costs to that weapon
system as the next best alternative based on the advice of contractors who maintain the
AFTOC database. In the rare cases where both fields are “null,” we discard the data
since we have no means of identifying the correct MDS. Table 5 shows an example of
the raw cost data retrieved from AFTOC.
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Table 5: Subset of Raw Cost Data from AFTOC

The cost data for the weapon systems we evaluate include 11,745 rows of data.
MDS SRD contains 3,593 values that are “null” (30.6% of the data); however, only 174
entries contain “null” in both MDS SRD and MD CAIG (1.5% of the data). This means
that we relied on our allocation heuristic to account for 29.1% of the cost data and we
discarded an additional 1.5% of the data.
As a final means of normalizing the data, we used inflation rates approved by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense to convert all costs to CY08$.
Additional Independent Variables
In order to have adequate information to build explanatory models, we collected
data on variables that have been shown in previous research to have predictive ability
with respect to AA. The following sections detail our remaining independent variables.
Usage Variables. We obtained quarterly flying hour, sortie, and landing data for
each MDS, by MAJCOM from the REMIS database. REMIS assigns the data both to the
command that owns the aircraft, and to the command that is operating the aircraft. As
one would expect, the owning command and the operating command are the same in the
vast majority of situations. However, circumstances arise where one unit may loan
aircraft to another unit for a given period. In this situation, we ignore the operating
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command and allocate the usage data to the command possessing the aircraft. This
heuristic follows the same logic we discussed previously concerning the allocation of
O&M cost data. Table 6 shows an example of the raw usage data obtained from REMIS.
Table 6: Subset of Raw Usage Data from REMIS

Inventory Variables. LIMS-EV contains data for average aircraft age, average
airframe hours, TAI, and PAI. As we discussed in Chapter II, TAI and PAI are two
different concepts. However, through conversations with LIMS-EV customer support
representatives and analysts in the AF/A4LY (Weapons System Division), we learned
that LIMS-EV does not reflect these terms accurately. At the time of this writing, data
provided from LIMS-EV under the column heading TAI is erroneous and the actual TAI
is represented under the “Poss’d” column heading. With that said, we acquired quarterly
data for TAI and monthly data for average age and average airframe hours for each MDS,
by MAJCOM. In order to remain consistent with the periods of data we collected for the
other independent variables and the dependent variable, we translate the monthly data
into quarterly periods by using only the observations for the last month of each quarter
(December, March, June, and September). Admittedly, we could have averaged the data
over each quarter to achieve the same objective, but for ease of computation and data
aggregation, we took the former approach. Furthermore, average age exhibits a perfect
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linear trend over time, which means our analysis is not affected by the choice we made in
normalizing our data. Table 7 shows an example of the raw inventory data from LIMSEV.
Table 7: Subset of Raw Inventory Data from LIMS-EV

Maintenance Variables. We retrieved maintenance data from LIMS-EV that
represent the various states of disrepair aircraft may be coded. Specifically, we collected
data on cannibalization hours and the five possible statuses of non-available aircraft,
which are the depot, NMCM, NMCS, NMCB, and UPNR rates. We do not include the
variables representing non-availability in our models since they would not provide any
useful explanatory information, but we do use cannibalization hours as an independent
variable. Although cannibalization hours represent non-availability, the practice of
cannibalizing aircraft is a proven method of providing necessary parts to other aircraft in
the fleet (Oliver, 2001).
Personnel Variables. AFTOC maintains annual data on the actual number of
personnel assigned to support a given MDS by AFSC for both officers and enlisted. We
obtained data reflecting specifically maintenance personnel for our study. We further
disaggregated the data by separating the data for officers from enlisted and also grouping
the enlisted data by skill level (1, 3, 5, 7, 9, or 0). Enlisted personnel typically enter a
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career field as a skill level one and progress upwards based on their time served in that
field and their demonstrated level of expertise; chief master sergeants are automatically
designated as skill level zero. Disaggregating the data in this manner allows us to
analyze more relationships such as the effect that higher proportions of low skill level
maintainers have on AA rates. In order to translate the annual periods into quarterly
periods, we reason that the number of assigned personnel fluctuates little over the course
of a year so we simply use the annual figures for all four quarters of the year. Table 8
shows an example of the raw personnel data retrieved from AFTOC.
Table 8: Subset of Raw Personnel Data from AFTOC

Dummy Variables: Location, Season, and Aircraft Characteristics. We created
dummy variables to represent the location, season, and characteristics of our MDS. We
use four location dummy variables to represent the five MAJCOMs and three seasonal
dummy variables to represent the four quarters in our study. We also create dummy
variables to represent each of the MDS groups and aircraft types in our study.
Table 9 provides a list of the dummy variables we created.
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Table 9: List of Dummy Variables

MAJCOM
AETC
AMC
PACAF
USAFE
(ACC is the base
case)

Quarter
Q2
Q3
Q4

MDS Group
B-1B
B-2A
B-52H
F-15C/D
F-15E
F-16C/D
KC-135
T-38

(Quarter 1 is the base
case)

Aircraft Type
Bomber
Fighter/Attack
Heavy
(Trainers are the base
case)

(The A-10 group is
the base case)

Data Aggregation
Our data can be analyzed on three separate dimensions: 1) type of aircraft, 2)
level of assignment of aircraft, and 3) units of time. First, it is possible to aggregate
aircraft data at a high level based on aircraft type (e.g. fighter or bomber) or at lower
levels such as MD (e.g. F-15 or A-10) or MDS (e.g. F-16C or F-15E). In his dissertation
published by RAND in 2008, Lt Col Eric Unger argued that O&M costs at the MDS level
in AFTOC suffer from data validity concerns. Specifically, he found that some costs
were allocated from the MD level to the MDS level based on proportion of flying hours
instead of actual expenditures for each MDS within the given MD. Consequently, some
data may be misallocated within the MD and using the data in explanatory models would
result in an overstatement of the relationship between flying hours and costs (Unger,
2008). Therefore, we evaluate aircraft at the MDS level only where AFTOC properly
allocates costs.
In his 2008 AFIT thesis, 1Lt Tyler Hess created cost forecasting models for the
Air Force flying hour program. His research built on Unger’s findings such that he was
able to analyze aircraft at the lowest possible level while still maintaining proper cost
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allocation. We build on Hess’s research and use the same MDS groupings that he proved
properly represented O&M costs (Hess, 2009). Table 10 shows the MDS in our study
and their final MDS grouping for our research.
Table 10: Assignment of MDS to MDS Groups

MDS Grouping

MDS
A-10A, OA-10A
B-1B
B-2A
B-52H
F-15C, F-15D
F-15E
F-16C, F-16D
KC-135R, KC-135T
T-38A, T-38C

A-10
B-1B
B-2A
B-52H
F-15C/D
F-15E
F-16C/D
KC-135
T-38

Second, our data can be analyzed at different levels of aggregation based on
location. For example, data can be acquired as low as the base level, it can be aggregated
to the MAJCOM level, or it can be further aggregated and analyzed at the Air Force
level. Hess found that analyzing cost and usage data at the base level presents construct
validity concerns. The crux of his argument was that costs are often misallocated at the
base level of aggregation because organizations often pay for things that go towards
supporting aircraft that they do not own. By moving from the base to the MAJCOM
level of aggregation, we are able to avoid much of the misallocation (Hess, 2009). Thus,
we choose to analyze our data at the MAJCOM level of aggregation for location.
Time is the final dimension for which our data can be aggregated. Typically, data
are available in monthly, quarterly, or annual periods. In order to have sufficient data
points for our analysis, we collected our data at the quarterly level of aggregation.
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Final Database
Once our data was normalized and aggregated at the quarterly level, we used
Microsoft Excel® and Microsoft Access® to create our final database. Table 11 shows
selected variables from the final database.
Table 11: Subset of Variables from Final Database

Variable Analysis Methodology
Because of the large number of independent variables we obtained data for, we
must investigate the potential predictive ability between each of them and the dependent
variable before we attempt to build models. Furthermore, we are interested in accounting
for the possibility that lagging relationships may exist between the independent variables
and the dependent variables. To test for this condition, we lag each independent variable
with respect to time one to four quarters into the future. These variables will depict the
relationship between an independent variable in one quarter and the dependent variable in
future quarters.
Correlation analysis is a convenient technique for expediently examining the
linear relationships between variables. Using JMP® release seven, we are able to
construct a multivariate matrix that shows the linear relationship between every
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combination of two variables. We use the correlation coefficient, which is a measure of
linear dependency between two variables on a negative one to one scale, to determine the
degree of correlation between any two of the variables. Coefficients with an absolute
value of one prove a perfect linear relationship between two variables (Wooldridge,
2006).
In addition to providing insight into which variables will be useful in explanatory
models, correlation analysis will help us identify potential cases of multicollinearity.
Multicollinearity refers to a correlation between independent variables in a multiple
regression model (Wooldridge, 2006). Because instances of multicollinearity add
confusion to a model by making it difficult to interpret the contribution of the
independent variables, we avoid it by not including pairs of variables in our models
where multicollinearity exists. In order to identify specific cases of multicollinearity, we
use JMP® to calculate variance inflation factors (VIF) for the independent variables in
our models. In practice, acceptable VIF levels are generally less than or equal to five or
ten. When VIF levels exceed these thresholds, it is a sign that a high degree of
multicollinearity exists for two or more of the independent variables. For our analysis,
we accept VIF measures of less than or equal to five.
We also examine the distribution of the data for each of our variables to determine
if there is a need to perform discrete analysis. Random variables that show irregular
patterns in their data may provide better predictive ability if the data is categorized into
discrete values (Wooldridge, 2006). In such cases, we create dummy variables to
represent the discrete data.
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Model Building Methodology
Since we have numerous variables that may prove to be explanatory in predicting
AA, we use multiple regression analysis to create our models. Briefly stated, multiple
regression allows us to simultaneously control for many variables when explaining the
response. In our case, this is an important attribute because we will be able to investigate
the affect O&M costs have on AA, while controlling for several other factors at the same
time.
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is the most commonly used method for estimating
the parameters of the regression model and it is the method we use in our study. OLS
estimates the parameters by minimizing the sum of squared errors between the actual and
predicted values of the model (referred to as the residuals). OLS provides the best linear
unbiased estimator for the parameters, given the assumptions of this technique are met.
We discuss the assumptions later in this chapter.
In a general form, multiple regression equations take the following structure:
Y = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + … + βkxk + ε

(4)

Where:
Y = dependent variable
x1, x2, … xk = independent variables
β0 = the intercept
β1, β2, … βk = the population coefficients
ε = the random error component
Our models are constructed in this fashion such that AA is explained to the maximum
extent possible. To guide our analysis, we use the five steps outlined below for building
valid, useful models (McClave et al., 2008:666):
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Step 1: Hypothesize the deterministic component of the model. This component
relates the mean, E(y), to the independent variables x1, x2, … xk. This involves
the choice of the independent variables to be included in the model.
Step2: Use the sample data to estimate the unknown model parameters β0, β1, β2,
… βk in the model.
Step 3: Specify the probability distribution of the random error term, ε, and
estimate the standard deviation of this distribution, σ.
Step 4: Check that the assumptions on ε are satisfied, and make model
modifications if necessary.
Step 5: Statistically evaluate the usefulness of the model.

Testing Regression Assumptions
Step four in the model building process outlined previously requires that the
assumptions of the random error term, ε, are satisfied. The assumptions refer to the
probability distribution of ε and are given as follows (McClave et al., 2008:667):
Assumption 1: Mean equal to zero.
Assumption 2: Variance equal to σ2 (also known as constant variance or
homoscedasticity).
Assumption 3: Normal distribution.
Assumption 4: Random errors are independent (in a probabilistic sense).
The validity of our models relies, in part, on the random error term meeting the
assumptions outlined above. We provide verification of the assumptions for all of our
models and discuss deviations from the assumptions in Chapter IV.
In order to check that the first assumption is met, we rely on visual inspection of a
plot of the residuals about a mean line of zero. We test for compliance with the second
assumption by visually analyzing the residual by predicted plots to determine whether
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any irregular patterns of variance are present. In addition, we use the Breusch-Pagan test
to statistically determine whether homoscedasticity exists. For this test, small p-values
reject the null hypothesis of constant variance; therefore, large p-values are desired. We
test the third assumption by plotting the studentized residuals in a histogram for visual
examination, followed by statistical validation using the Shapiro-Wilk test. Similar to the
Breusch-Pagan test, large p-values are preferred so that we may accept the null
hypothesis of normality. Failure to meet the fourth assumption is caused by
autocorrelation of the residuals, meaning each residual is affected by the previous one.
We check for autocorrelation by analyzing a plot of the residuals by row in order to see if
any trends are obvious. We further test this assumption using the Durbin-Watson test
which tests for autocorrelation at lag one. Empirical evidence shows that data for AA
rates may be subject to positive autocorrelation (high residuals tend to be followed by
high residuals, and negative residuals tend to be followed by negative residuals) (Oliver,
2001). Given this knowledge, we use a left-tailed test for positive autocorrelation and
reject the null hypothesis of independence whenever p-values are less than 0.05.
In addition to the assumptions already discussed, we analyze every data point in
our models using the Cook’s D Influence statistic. This statistic measures the influence a
given data point has on the overall model. For our analysis, we specify large Cook’s D
measures as those values over 0.5. In cases where a data point has a Cook’s D value
greater than 0.5, we re-run the model with that data point excluded in order to determine
whether it should remain in the model. If there are no significant changes to the p-values
of the overall model or individual parameter p-values, we allow the data point to remain
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in the model. Additionally, we attempt to provide an explanation for why the data point
was influential.

Model Validation
In order to determine the robustness of the predictive ability of our explanatory
models, we must validate our models. To do this, we set aside the final 9 quarters of data
from our original dataset (20 percent) while building our models. Once our models are
complete, we combine the independent variable data from the final nine quarters with the
data used to build the model. The dependent variable data for the last nine quarters
remains excluded so that when the model is run in JMP®, we are able to generate
prediction intervals for each of those quarters. Finally, we are able to determine if the
actual values of the dependent variable for the nine quarters fall within the prediction
interval in addition to comparing the actual values to the values predicted by the model.
Using this procedure for model validation allows us to evaluate our model’s usefulness
when new data from outside the original sample is used for prediction.

Chapter Summary
In Chapter III, we outlined the scope of our research effort and detailed the data
we use to perform our analysis. We explained the statistical techniques we use to
investigate the predictive ability of our data and construct our explanatory models.
Lastly, we described how we test that the assumptions of our regression models are
satisfied and how we validate the models’ usefulness. In the next chapter, we describe
our analysis and detail the results.
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IV: Analysis and Results

Using the methods described in the previous chapter, we discuss our analysis and
the results of our study in Chapter IV. First, we outline the challenges presented by our
data and the techniques we use to overcome the problems. Next, we evaluate the models
created for each of the MDS in our study. Finally, we summarize our results and discuss
other techniques that we explore for establishing a relationship between O&M costs and
AA.

Adjustments to Data Required for Analysis
We begin by estimating models for each MDS by MAJCOM with AA hours as
the dependent variable and total EEIC 644 costs, flying hours, sorties, landings, TAI, and
average age as the independent variables. Not surprisingly, we encounter problems with
multicollinearity for several of the independent variables. Table 12 is a correlation
matrix of the variables in the model for ACC F-15C/Ds. Although the data is different
for every MDS and MAJCOM, the data we show for ACC F-15C/Ds is representative of
the correlations we find with nearly all of the other MDS in our study. Thus, we use this
regression output as an example to explain the common problems encountered with all of
the MDS in our study.
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Table 12: Correlation Matrix of Variables for ACC F-15C/Ds

AA Hrs
AA Hrs
Total
EEIC 644
Fly Hrs
Sorties
Landings
TAI
Avg Age

1.0000

Total
EEIC 644
0.2620
1.0000

Fly Hrs

Sorties

Landings

TAI

Avg Age

0.8293

0.8727

0.8722

0.8940

-0.5135

0.1047

0.2348

0.2344

0.1924

0.1589

1.0000

0.8633
1.0000

0.8637
1.0000
1.0000

0.8808
0.8755
0.8752
1.0000

-0.7820
-0.6050
-0.6057
-0.7489
1.0000

Due to their obvious operational relationships, flying hours, sorties, and landings
exhibit very high degrees of correlation. In fact, sorties and landings are perfectly
correlated for this dataset as exhibited with a correlation coefficient of 1.00, while flying
hours yields correlation coefficients of 0.8633 and 0.8637 with sorties and landings,
respectively (highlighted in bold in Table 12). Additionally, we calculate VIF scores for
these three variables as shown in Table 13; all measures exceed our threshold of five.
Table 13: VIF Scores for Usage Variables in Initial ACC F-15C/D Model

Term
Fly Hrs
Sorties
Landings

VIF
7.455
66724.138
66644.096

Therefore, we determine that it would be unwise to include more than one of the
usage variables in our models since doing so would make it difficult to interpret the
contribution of each variable to the model. As a rule, we elect to use flying hours as our
usage variable of choice in all models where it demonstrates predictive ability.
Next, we see that changes in TAI over time in our dataset result in overstated
relationships between AA hours and nearly all of the independent variables in our dataset,
except average age. The reason for this is simple. TAI fluctuates as the result of several
factors such as organizational or mission changes within operational Air Force units and
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the retirement or acquisition of new aircraft. When these events occur, it is natural for
other changes to take place such as movement of personnel and resources. If the number
of aircraft is reduced, it follows that the number of operators and maintainers will
decrease as well, resulting in fewer flying hours and fewer total available hours. In order
to address this problem, we convert all of our variables, with the exception of average
age, into a rate of some kind. AA is commonly expressed as a percentage so it makes
sense to use the AA rate as our dependent variable. For all of our independent variables
(except age), we divide each data point by TAI which results in variables represented as a
“per-aircraft” rate. This procedure results in variables that show genuine relationships in
our models and allow for direct comparison across MAJCOMs and MDS.

Explanatory Models
Using the model building process outlined in the previous chapter, we developed
models for 16 of our 22 MDS by MAJCOM by quarter datasets. Of those 16 models,
only 2 found EEIC 644 costs as a predictive variable. Nonetheless, we discuss the four
best models in detail (those with an adjusted R2 of greater than 0.70), and then summarize
the remaining models. Appendix A contains a complete review of our results.
KC-135 by AMC by Quarter
Table 14 highlights the summary statistics of our model for KC-135 aircraft in Air
Mobility Command (AMC). Only flying hours per TAI and the dependent variable
lagged one period are included as independent variables. We utilize the dependent
variable lagged one period in this model because without it we notice first order
autocorrelation with a Durban-Watson statistic of 0.46, which is significant at the 0.01
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level. Additionally, the model’s adjusted R2 falls from 0.86945 to 0.51178 without the
lagged dependent variable included in the model.
Prior to accepting this specification as a useful model, we verified that the
assumptions of normality, constant variance, and independence were met as described in
the previous chapter. Additionally, we checked for influential data points using the
Cook’s D test and found that no observations were influential. We provide the results of
our diagnostic tests for this model in Appendix B.
Table 14: KC-135 (AMC) Explanatory Model

Summary of Fit
R2
Adjusted R2
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)
Analysis of Variance
Source
Model
Error
C. Total
Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
FlyHrs/TAI
1QLagAARate

0.87736
0.86945
0.02655
0.60528
34
DF
2
31
33
Estimate
0.12256
0.00061
0.67384

Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
0.15627
0.07813 110.887
0.02184
0.00070 Prob > F
0.17812
<.0001
Std Error
0.04113
0.00015
0.08413

t Ratio
Prob>|t| VIF
2.98 0.0056
3.99 0.0004 1.807
8.01 <.0001 1.807

To test the robustness and validity of the model, we include the final nine periods
of independent variable data and run the model in JMP®. This process generates
individual prediction intervals for the dependent variable at each of the nine periods.
Theoretically, our model should be able to predict AA rates within the prediction
intervals (at 95% confidence) 95% of the time. We show the results of this analysis in
Table 15 and Figure 7.
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Table 15: KC-135 (AMC) Sensitivity Analysis

Lower 95%
Observed AA
FY-Q
Confidence
Rate
2006-Q4
0.6524
0.6875
2007-Q1
0.6294
0.6235*
2007-Q2
0.5908
0.6223
2007-Q3
0.6029
0.6436
2007-Q4
0.6285
0.6351
2008-Q1
0.6104
0.6337
2008-Q2
0.6168
0.6112*
2008-Q3
0.6035
0.6619
2008-Q4
0.6487
0.6454*
*Observations fall outside prediction interval

Predicted AA
Rate
0.7095
0.6854
0.6474
0.6618
0.6892
0.6686
0.6767
0.6652
0.7108

Upper 95%
Confidence
0.7666
0.7414
0.7039
0.7208
0.7500
0.7268
0.7366
0.7268
0.7729

Absolute
Percent Error
3.19%
9.91%
4.02%
2.83%
8.53%
5.50%
10.72%
0.49%
10.14%
MAPE = 6.15%

Although this was our best model with respect to the adjusted R2 value, empirical
results show that the observed AA rates fell within the prediction interval only 66.7% of
the time. We should also note that the prediction intervals had an average range of 0.12,
which means that our model should predict AA rates within a window of 12 percentage
points. Given that this could mean the difference between achieving a stated goal for AA
or falling well short, the prediction interval range produced by our model may be too
large to be useful for Air Force decision makers. Additionally, the mean absolute percent
error (MAPE) for this model was 6.15%.
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Figure 7: KC-135 (AMC) Sensitivity Analysis

Figure 7 is useful because it visually shows the trend of AMC KC-135 AA rates
over the last four years. We can see that the AA rates observed during the last nine
quarters are mostly lower than previous quarters. Additionally, our model failed to
predict this trend. One possible reason is that the range of independent variable data used
to produce the model does not reflect the range of data used to validate the model. As a
rule, a model's usefulness will suffer if it is used to predict a response outside the range of
data from which it was created. Specifically, the data we used when constructing the
model for the flying hours per TAI variable ranged from a low of 67.6 to a high of 184.9.
However, the data used for this variable when we validated the model exceeded this
threshold seven times with values ranging from 187.9 to 232.4. We show the ranges of
independent variable data in Appendix C.
F-15E by ACC by Quarter
Our next model is for F-15Es in Air Combat Command (ACC). Table 16 shows
the summary statistics, which include an adjusted R2 of 0.80918. We use cannibalization
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hours per TAI, the total number of 1-, 3-, and 5-level maintainers per TAI, and the
dependent variable lagged one period as independent variables. Again, we include the
lagged dependent variable in this model because without it we notice first order
autocorrelation with a Durban-Watson statistic of 1.46, which is significant at the 0.05
level. Moreover, the model’s adjusted R2 drops to 0.75472 without the lagged dependent
variable included in the model.
Just as we did with the first model, we verified that the assumptions of normality,
constant variance, and independence were met, in addition to checking for influential data
points. Yet again, all assumptions were satisfied.
Table 16: F-15E (ACC) Explanatory Model

Summary of Fit
R2
Adjusted R2
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)
Analysis of Variance
Source
Model
Error
C. Total
Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
1QLagAARate
CANNhrs/TAI
1,3,5_SkillLvl/TAI

0.82653
0.80918
0.01708
0.67059
34
DF
3
30
33
Estimate
0.31488
0.38525
-0.00105
0.01015

Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
0.04173
0.01391 47.647
0.00875
0.00029 Prob > F
0.05049
<.0001
Std Error
0.08637
0.12231
0.00022
0.00454

t Ratio
Prob>|t|
3.65 0.0010
3.15 0.0037
-4.73 <.0001
2.23 0.0333

VIF
2.555
2.228
1.274

Using the same process as before, we test the validity of our model by including
the final nine periods of independent variable data and running the model in JMP®. Table
17 and Figure 8 provide the results of this analysis.
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Table 17: F-15E (ACC) Sensitivity Analysis

Lower 95%
Observed AA
FY-Q
Confidence
Rate
2006-Q4
0.6689
0.6740
2007-Q1
0.6735
0.6788
2007-Q2
0.6742
0.7108
2007-Q3
0.6870
0.6899
2007-Q4
0.6792
0.6632*
2008-Q1
0.6679
0.5930*
2008-Q2
0.6310
0.6737
2008-Q3
0.6741
0.6918
2008-Q4
0.6797
0.6324*
*Observations fall outside prediction interval

Predicted AA
Rate
0.7050
0.7141
0.7128
0.7248
0.7184
0.7085
0.6801
0.7141
0.7181

Upper 95%
Confidence
0.7412
0.7547
0.7514
0.7625
0.7575
0.7490
0.7292
0.7541
0.7564

Absolute
Percent Error
4.61%
5.20%
0.28%
5.05%
8.32%
19.47%
0.95%
3.22%
13.55%
MAPE = 6.74%

Our model for F-15Es in ACC performs nearly as well as our first model. Again,
six out of nine (66.7%) observations fall within the prediction interval; however, the
MAPE is slightly larger at 6.74%. Furthermore, the range of our prediction intervals is
smaller than the first model with an average of 0.08 (i.e., 8% in terms of the AA rates).
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Figure 8: F-15E (ACC) Sensitivity Analysis

Figure 8 shows a sharp decrease in the AA rate during the first quarter of 2008
that our model did not predict. In our model’s defense, this observation may be
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considered somewhat of an outlier. After mechanical failure resulted in the crash of an
Air National Guard F-15C on November 2, 2007, the Air Force grounded all F-15 models
until an investigation was conducted. Later, on November 15, 2007, the Air Force began
lifting the restriction for F-15Es after they concluded that the E-model was not
susceptible to the same failure. Nonetheless, F-15Es were still grounded for at least 13
days which resulted in a low AA rate for the first quarter of 2008 (Wicke, 2007). Finally,
we must consider that the independent variable data used to validate the model fell
outside the range of data used to construct the model six times for the cannibalization
hours per TAI variable and once for the total number of 1-, 3-, and 5-level maintainers
per TAI variable.
B-1 by ACC by Quarter
Our third model is for B-1 aircraft in ACC. Table 18 provides the summary
statistics for this model. We use the three regressors from the first two models, in
addition to the dependent variable lagged one period as independent variables for our B-1
model. Due to first order autocorrelation as evidenced by a Durban-Watson statistic of
0.75 (significant at the 0.01 level), we included the lagged dependent variable.
Additionally, the model’s adjusted R2 decreases from 0.76778 to 0.61946 without the
lagged dependent variable included in the model. Interestingly, the coefficient for the
total number of 1-, 3-, and 5-level maintainers per TAI is negative in this equation where
it was positive in the model for F-15Es. We suspect that as the total number of lower
skilled maintainers reaches a tipping point, they begin to adversely affect AA rates,
especially if the total number of highly skilled maintainers does not increase at the same
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rate. In this situation, the total number of maintainers may be constant, but the proportion
of low-skill maintainers will be increasing.
As we did with the first two models, we verified that the assumptions of
normality, constant variance, and independence were met, in addition to checking for
influential data points. Here again, all assumptions were fulfilled.
Table 18: B-1 (ACC) Explanatory Model

Summary of Fit
R2
Adjusted R2
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.79593
0.76778
0.03423
0.50145
34

Analysis of Variance
Source
Model
Error
C. Total

DF

Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
4
0.13255
0.03313 28.278
29
0.03398
0.00117 Prob > F
33
0.16654
<.0001

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
FlyHrs/TAI
CANNhrs/TAI
1,3,5_SkillLvl/TAI
1QLagAARate

Estimate
0.54769
0.00177
-0.00139
-0.01053
0.61311

Std Error
0.14720
0.00067
0.00043
0.00378
0.13618

t Ratio
Prob>|t|
3.72 0.0008
2.61 0.0141
-3.23 0.0031
-2.78 0.0094
4.50 0.0001

VIF
3.672
3.705
5.148
2.579

Once again, we test the validity of our model by including the final nine periods
of independent variable data and running the model in JMP®. Table 19 and Figure 9
provide the results of this analysis.
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Table 19: B-1 (ACC) Sensitivity Analysis

Lower 95%
Observed AA
FY-Q
Confidence
Rate
2006-Q4
0.5419
0.5267*
2007-Q1
0.5316
0.5265*
2007-Q2
0.5404
0.5202*
2007-Q3
0.5339
0.5120*
2007-Q4
0.4975
0.5194
2008-Q1
0.5459
0.5003*
2008-Q2
0.5241
0.4302*
2008-Q3
0.4723
0.3644*
2008-Q4
0.4205
0.3373*
*Observations fall outside prediction interval

Predicted AA
Rate
0.6217
0.6246
0.6414
0.6338
0.5790
0.6526
0.6264
0.5835
0.5426

Upper 95%
Confidence
0.7014
0.7177
0.7424
0.7337
0.6605
0.7593
0.7287
0.6947
0.6647

Absolute
Percent Error
18.02%
18.64%
23.29%
23.78%
11.49%
30.45%
45.62%
60.14%
60.89%
MAPE = 32.48%

Immediately we find that only one out of nine observations fell within the
prediction interval generated by our model. The failure of our model is magnified when
we consider that the average range of our prediction intervals was nearly 0.20 (i.e., 20%
in terms of the predicted AA rates). Lastly, our model produced a MAPE of 32.48%.
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Figure 9: B-1 (ACC) Sensitivity Analysis
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Figure 9 plainly shows that B-1s experienced a steady and dramatic decline in AA
rates during the time period used to test our model, but we were unable to find a
definitive reason as to why this trend occurred. According to Air Force officials, the
decline in AA rates is simply a sign of deterioration on individual components, not an
indication of a specific problem (Rolfsen, 2008). Additionally, the data used for our
variables to validate the model fell within the original range of data in every instance
with the exception of the data used for cannibalization hours per TAI, which used four
observations below the original range of data. This suggests that something related to B1 AA rates fundamentally changed during the final nine periods; however, we were
unable to capture this change with the variables for which we had data.
KC-135 by AETC by Quarter
The last model we will discuss is for KC-135s in Air Education and Training
Command (AETC). As shown in Table 20, this model is the first for which we are able
to use total EEIC 644 costs (lagged one period) as an independent variable. We also use
average aircraft age and the lagged dependent variable as regressors in this model. Again,
we must include the lagged dependent variable because without it we see first order
autocorrelation given by a Durban-Watson statistic of 0.82 (significant at the 0.01 level).
Furthermore, the adjusted R2 drops from 0.70286 to 0.51723 without the AA rate lagged
one period included in the model.
Lastly, we verified that the assumptions of the random error term were satisfied,
in addition to checking for influential data points. Like the first three models, all
assumptions were met.
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Table 20: KC-135 (AETC) Explanatory Model

Summary of Fit
R2
Adjusted R2
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.72987
0.70286
0.04218
0.73629
34

Analysis of Variance
Source
Model
Error
C. Total

DF
3
30
33

Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
0.14427
0.04809 27.0198
0.05339
0.00178 Prob > F
0.19767
<.0001

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
TotalEEIC644/TAI (Lag 1)
Avg Age
1QLagAARate

Estimate
-0.15297
4.473E-07
0.01082
0.56119

Std Error
0.11357
2.272E-07
0.00359
0.12435

t Ratio
Prob>|t|
-1.35 0.1881
1.97 0.0583
3.01 0.0052
4.51 <.0001

VIF
1.022
1.584
1.575

Once more, we test the validity of our model by including the final nine periods of
independent variable data and running the model in JMP®. Table 21 and Figure 10
provide the results of this analysis.
Table 21: KC-135 (AETC) Sensitivity Analysis

Lower 95%
Observed AA
FY-Q
Confidence
Rate
2006-Q4
0.7718
0.8492
2007-Q1
0.7770
0.7876
2007-Q2
0.7163
0.7464
2007-Q3
0.7033
0.7576
2007-Q4
0.7239
0.7715
2008-Q1
0.7301
0.8416
2008-Q2
0.7517
0.7724
2008-Q3
0.7174
0.7834
2008-Q4
0.7427
0.7310*
*Observation falls outside prediction interval

Predicted AA
Rate
0.8643
0.8702
0.8097
0.7977
0.8186
0.8251
0.8494
0.8167
0.8408

Upper 95%
Confidence
0.9569
0.9633
0.9032
0.8921
0.9132
0.9200
0.9471
0.9160
0.9389

Absolute
Percent Error
1.78%
10.49%
8.48%
5.30%
6.10%
1.97%
9.97%
4.25%
15.01%
MAPE = 7.04%

Although eight out of nine observations fall within the prediction interval, we can
attribute some of this success to the fact that our model produced prediction intervals
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with an average range of 0.19. Such a large range when forecasting AA rates make this
model’s usefulness questionable. Finally, the MAPE for this model is 7.04%.
1.00
0.95

AA Rate

0.90
0.85
Observed AA Rate

0.80

Predicted AA Rate

0.75

Lower 95% Prediction

0.70

2005-Q1
2005-Q2
2005-Q3
2005-Q4
2006-Q1
2006-Q2
2006-Q3
2006-Q4
2007-Q1
2007-Q2
2007-Q3
2007-Q4
2008-Q1
2008-Q2
2008-Q3
2008-Q4

0.65

Upper 95% Prediction
Out of Sample Data

Fiscal Year - Quarter

Figure 10: KC-135 (AETC) Sensitivity Analysis

Summary of Remaining Models
Table 22 summarizes the remaining models to include the adjusted R2 values,
variable coefficients, and failed assumptions that we were unable to avoid. In cases
where we collected data on MDS that operate in more than one MAJCOM (e.g., A-10, F15E), we attempted to develop models that would be useful in predicting AA rates for the
entire fleet of aircraft across each MAJCOM. However, due to the apparent differences
in predictive variables, we were unable to produce useful models for an MDS across all
of its MAJCOMs. It goes without saying, therefore, that we were unable to develop
useful models to represent more than one MDS.
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Other Variables

-

-

-0.06561

-

0.04166
(note 2)

none

-

-

-

-

-

none

-

-

-

0.05395

-

-

none

0.52320 34 0.66465 0.00117

USAFE 0.40542 34 0.38250

(see codes below)

Total
Maintainers/
TAI

-

Failed
Assumptions

1,3,5/7,9,0 Skill
Level Ratio
(note 1)

1QLag AARate

n

Adj R^2

EEIC644/ TAI
(Lag 1)

A-10

ACC

Avg Age

A-10

PACAF 0.55399 34 0.39325

FlyHrs/ TAI

A-10

MAJCOM

MDS

Table 22: Summary of Models Created for Remaining MDS and MAJCOMs

B-2

ACC

0.45791 35

0.00145

-

-

0.13274

-

-

none

B-52

ACC

0.30829 34 0.45696 -0.00074

-

-

-

-

-

none

F-15C/D

ACC

0.65512 35

-

-

-

-

1.0203E-07

-

-

-

none
A
(note 3)

-

-

F-15C/D AETC 0.41891 34 0.45637

0.00189 0.01215
-

-

F-15C/D PACAF

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

F-15C/D USAFE

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

0.68421 34 0.49512

-

-

-

-0.04230

0.00843

F-16C/D PACAF 0.63977 33 0.80798

-

-

-

-

F-16C/D AETC 0.41748 35

-

-

-

-

-

F-16C/D USAFE

-

-

-

-

-

KC-135 PACAF 0.49527 34 0.41306 0.00179 0.01975

-

-0.09711

-

-

none

KC-135 USAFE

F-15E

USAFE

F-16C/D

ACC

-

-

-

-

-

none
-0.02696
D
(note 4) (note 5)
A
(note 6)
0.01518
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

T-38

AETC 0.63190 34 0.64955

-

0.00371

-

-

-

-

D
(note 7)

T-38

ACC

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Failed Assumptions: (A) Normality; (B) Constant Variance; (C) Independence; (D) Influential Data Points
Notes: 1.) This variable represents the ratio of 1-, 3-, and 5-level maintainers to 7-, 9-, and 0-level maintainers.
2.) A dummy variable to represent the 3rd Quarter of each fiscal year demonstrated predictive ability. 3.) The
model failed the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality with a p-value of 0.0429. 4.) A dummy variable to represent the
4th Quarter of each fiscal year demonstrated predictive ability. 5.) An influential data point was removed from
the model because it significantly changed p-values. 6.) The model failed the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality
with a p-value of 0.0332. 7.) An influential data point was allowed to remain in the model because the model
was not changed when it was removed.
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Further Analysis
Given our inability to develop regression models that show a definitive
relationship between O&M costs and AA rates using our preferred strategy, we explore
two more techniques.
During our review of the data, we notice that there is a high level of O&M costs
recorded in EEIC 644 in the fourth quarter of each year for almost every MDS and
MAJCOM (when compared to the previous quarters of the same fiscal year). An
example of this trend is shown in Figure 11 for the A-10 in ACC. This occurrence is not
surprising since units often have to spend their remaining funds at a higher rate at the end
of a fiscal year. Accordingly, this phenomenon should make it possible for us to test our
hypothesis that increased spending leads to higher AA rates. In order to test our theory,
we use dummy variables to represent each quarter of the fiscal year in our regression
model. If there is a statistically significant difference between one of the quarters and the
other three, we will see this in the form of a low p-value and a significant independent
variable in our model. We repeat this process several times in order to allow each quarter
to serve as the baseline and include various combinations of the dummy variables
representing each quarter in our model. However, multiple attempts using this technique
for every MDS and MAJCOM failed to show any significant difference from one quarter
to the next.
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Figure 11: A-10 (ACC) EEIC 644 Costs by FY Quarter

For our next attempt at modeling AA rates using O&M costs, we take a different
approach and use two of the variables representing non-availability as the dependent
variable in our regression models. First, we use the NMCS rate as the dependent variable
in order to see if we can model the percentage of aircraft that are not mission capable for
supply reasons. Second, we use the NMCM rate as the dependent variable and attempt to
model the percentage of aircraft that are not mission capable for maintenance reasons. If
we are able to produce predictive models that explain either NMCS or NMCM, we will
be able to extract results that are nearly as useful as modeling AA rates directly.
However, using these metrics as dependent variables does not produce better models.

Chapter Summary
In Chapter IV, we explained the challenges presented by our data and the
techniques we used to overcome these difficulties. Next, we detailed the results of our
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four best explanatory models and summarized the remaining models. Finally, we
explored two other techniques for examining our data, but with only marginal success.
In the next chapter, we use our findings to address our research questions. Then,
we discuss policy implications and the strengths and limitations of our study as well as
opportunities for further research.
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V: Conclusions

In this chapter, we provide answers to our research questions based on the results
of our study. Next, we discuss potential policy implications. Finally, we highlight the
strengths and limitations of our study while suggesting areas for further research.

Research Questions
1. What variables are significant predictors of AA rates?
Of the 16 models we developed, we find that the dependent variable lagged one
period is a significant predictor in 13 of our models. Admittedly, this variable was
included primarily to help mitigate the negative effects of autocorrelation in the residuals,
and its explanatory contribution is of limited usefulness to decision makers. By
definition, we must have the current period’s AA rate in order to forecast the next
period’s AA rate. This requirement makes it very difficult for the models to be useful
beyond one period into the future.
Next, we find that the flying hours per TAI variable is a predictive independent
variable in seven of our models. For all but one, the coefficient is positive which
suggests that flying aircraft more often increases the AA rate. The coefficient is only
negative for the B-52 by ACC by quarter model.
Finally, our results show that the variable representing the ratio of 1-, 3-, and 5level maintainers to 7-, 9-, and 0-level maintainers is predictive in five of our models;
however, the coefficients are mixed. Three models show negative coefficients, which
imply that larger numbers of low skilled maintainers decrease the effectiveness of the
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maintenance being performed, resulting in lower AA rates. The other two models result
in positive coefficients, which imply the opposite effect. Intuitively, this makes less
sense. We hypothesize that where positive coefficients are found, this variable is
reflecting some other effect such as larger numbers of maintainers in general.
2. Are AA rates influenced by changes in O&M spending?
From the analysis we performed, we are unable to show that AA rates are
significantly influenced by changes in the amount of O&M spending. Using total EEIC
644 costs as our variable to represent O&M spending, we find that it is predictive in only
2 of our 16 models (12.5%). Both the KC-135 by AETC by quarter model and the F15C/D by AETC by quarter model found total EEIC 644 costs to be useful in predicting
AA rates.
3. Do the AA rates of some weapon systems respond to changes in O&M costs
more than others?
Our models indicated that AA rates of only the KC-135 in AETC and the F15C/D in AETC responded to changes in O&M spending. Given our limited findings, we
are unable to determine if the AA rates of some weapon systems respond to changes in
O&M spending more than others.
4. Can a single model be developed to represent multiple MDS?
Despite repeated attempts, we were unable to develop a model that would
represent multiple MDS or multiple MAJCOMs for a single MDS. The models we
created are specific to a particular MDS and MAJCOM.
5. Can the models produced by this research be used as an effective decision tool
for the Centralized Asset Management (CAM) office?

64

Given our lack of findings with respect to O&M costs and AA, we do not believe
that the CAM office would find our models useful for allocating resources. With more
research, we hope that models will be developed that shed light on the relationship
between O&M costs and AA rates.

Policy Implications
As we discussed in Chapter II, CAM is significantly changing the way Air Force
maintenance organizations acquire and pay for parts and supplies. Instead of purchasing
items at the base level, CAM now centrally manages the process for all active duty units.
Although we previously focused on the many positive attributes of the new process, we
must consider the potential negative consequences of centralization. Before CAM was
implemented, base level maintenance organizations were incentivized to be fiscally
responsible. They were constrained by their base level budget, which encouraged them
to be cost effective and repair parts which could be redeemed for credits to pay for other
items. Now that funds are centrally managed, the Air Force must ensure that base level
maintenance organizations continue to operate responsibly. If base level organizations no
longer feel constrained by their local budgets, they may begin to operate in a less cost
effective manner resulting in higher overall costs to the Air Force.

Strengths, Limitations, and Further Research
Although our research failed to draw a definitive link between O&M costs and
AA rates, the data we collected and the variables we used in our study were reliable. Our
data was extracted directly from official Air Force databases and we used extreme care
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when compiling our database. Furthermore, we carefully analyzed our variables and
incorporated them in our models in a fashion that would not result in disingenuous
findings.
We chose total costs recorded in EEIC 644 to represent O&M costs because we
were able to show a clear link between the money spent and the aircraft type supported.
In hindsight, this may have been a weakness in our analysis. The CAM office manages a
large portfolio of funds for the Air Force. Figure 12 shows the funding posture for
FY2010, which totals $12,363.1 million. Budgeted at $2,147.8 million, EEIC 644
accounts for nearly half of the flying hour program; however, we can plainly see that the
majority of O&M costs managed by CAM are not represented by our variable. We
suggest that further research be done to include Depot Purchased Equipment
Maintenance (EEICs 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 548, and 549), Sustaining
Engineering (EEIC 583), Technical Orders (EEIC 594), and Flying Hour Program costs
(EEICs 605, 609, 61952, 69302, and 699 in addition to EEIC 644).

Figure 12: CAM FY2010 Funding Posture (in millions, BY10$)
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We selected our range of data to include FY1998 – 2008 because we were able to
ensure consistent accounting of EEIC 644 costs during that timeframe. Given several
more years of post-CAM data (FY2008 and beyond), we feel that this study may produce
entirely different results. As we discussed in Chapter II, the resource allocation process
prior to CAM was not designed to manage weapon systems from a performance-based
perspective. Now that the Air Force is operating with CAM and a philosophy of
“performance-based logistics,” we hypothesize that a study done in the future would
yield more useful and interesting results.
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Appendix A: Summary of Results for All Models

1,3,5/ 7,9,0 Skill
Level Ratio
(note 1)
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TAI
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-
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-
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-
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-

-

-

-

-

-
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-

-

-

-

-

-
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-

(see codes below)
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n
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A-10

PACAF 0.55399 34 0.39325

FlyHrs/ TAI

A-10

MAJCOM
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Summary of Regression Coefficients and Adjusted R2 Values

0.00189 0.01215
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-
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-

-
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-
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-
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-

-
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-

-

-

-

-
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USAFE
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-

-

-
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-

-

-

none

-

-

-

-

-

F-16C/D AETC 0.41748 35

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

F-16C/D USAFE

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

KC-135

AMC 0.86945 34 0.67384 0.000612
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AETC 0.70286 34 0.56119

-
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-
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-
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-

-

-

-

-

-

-
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-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

KC-135 USAFE

-

-

none
none

KC-135 PACAF 0.49527 34 0.41306 0.00179 0.01975
-

none
-0.02696
D
(note 4) (note 5)
A
(note 6)
0.01518
-

-0.04230 0.00843

T-38

AETC 0.63190 34 0.64955

-

0.00371

-

-
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-

-

-
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-

-

-

-

-

-
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-
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Failed Assumptions: (A) Normality; (B) Constant Variance; (C) Independence; (D) Influential Data Points
Notes: 1.) This variable represents the ratio of 1-, 3-, and 5-level maintainers to 7-, 9-, and 0-level maintainers. 2.) A dummy
variable to represent the 3rd Quarter of each fiscal year demonstrated predictive ability. 3.) The model failed the Shapiro-Wilk
test for normality with a p-value of 0.0429. 4.) A dummy variable to represent the 4th Quarter of each fiscal year demonstrated
predictive ability. 5.) An influential data point was removed from the model because it significantly changed p-values. 6.) The
model failed the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality with a p-value of 0.0332. 7.) An influential data point was allowed to remain in
the model because the model was not changed when it was removed.
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Appendix B: Sample of OLS Regression Diagnostic Tests

KC-135 by AMC by Quarter Model
First, we show a histogram of studentized residuals followed by the Shapiro-Wilk
Test for normality. The null hypothesis is that the residuals come from a normal
distribution; small p-values reject the null hypothesis. Alpha is 0.05 for all tests.

-2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0

0.5

1

1.5

2

Shapiro-Wilk Test
W
Prob<W
0.9768
0.6704
Next, we show the residual by predicted plot and the Breusch-Pagan test for
constant variance of the residuals. The null hypothesis is that the residuals exhibit
constant variance; small p-values reject the null hypothesis.
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Third, we show the residual by row plot and the Durbin-Watson test for
autocorrelation.

The null hypothesis is that the residuals are not serially correlated;

small p-values reject the null hypothesis.
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Last, we show the Cook’s Distance plot for influential data points. We use a
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value of 0.5 as our cutoff for points that are influential and require additional inspection.
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Appendix C: Range of Independent Variable Data Used to Construct Models

KC-135 by AMC by Quarter Model
Variable
1QLagAARate
FlyHrs/TAI

Min
0.4637
67.57

Max
0.7091
184.86

F-15E by ACC by Quarter Model
Variable
1QLagAARate
CANNhrs/TAI
1,3,5_SkillLvl/TAI

Min
0.5854
23.35
14.45

Max
0.7238
101.21
16.68

Min
0.3797
46.94
29.27
52.89

Max
0.6205
141.59
41.36
106.99

B-1 by ACC by Quarter
Variable
1QLagAARate
CANNhrs/TAI
1,3,5_SkillLvl/TAI
FlyHrs/TAI

KC-135 by AETC by Quarter
Variable
1QLagAARate
TotalEEIC644/TAI (Lag 1)
Avg Age
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Min
0.5877
44,920
35.22

Max
0.8476
188,551
43.67
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